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HABERMAS AND ARGUMENTATION
IN THE PHILIPPINE CONTEXT
MARIA LOVELYN CORPUZ PACLIBAR
The article critically analyzes the perception on the incompatibility of the
Filipino self-understanding as kapwa with Habermas’s notion of
argumentative discourse that champions autonomy and individuality. It
argues that this apparent incompatibility is more due to the absence of an
imagination of non-Western forms of rationalization processes and
reflexivity, than to the commonly held claim of the incommensurability of
lifeworlds. The key to this imagination is to locate potential rationalization
processes from within modes of communication that reinforce kapwa
solidarity. In the end, the article shows that kwentuhan, which is the mode
of communication that is integrated with kapwa solidarity, contains
enabling components for reflexivity, and thereby makes individuals more
open and receptive to the process of argumentation as a rational and
inclusive procedure for resolving conflicts.

INTRODUCTION

A

t the center of Jürgen Habermas’s discourse theory is an
elaboration of argumentation as “an exemplary local
embodiment” of the most inclusive discourse.1 Argumentation, as
the most reflexive form of giving and taking reasons among
communicative participants, operates on “unavoidably assumed”
components: first, that the participants understand themselves as
autonomous (the authors of their own positions); second, that the
process is directed towards an unforced agreement. These comprise
1

Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions To a Discourse
Theory of Law And Democracy, trans. William Rehg (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press,
1996), 16.
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the presupposition of equality or symmetry among individuals.2
While other communication modes of exchanging reasons also rest
on the presupposition of equality, Habermas insists that it is in
argumentative mode of communication that these become more
explicit. Rational argumentation operates as a process of resolving
conflicts where participants are temporarily abstracted from the
particular solidarities of family, neighborhood, city or state.
3
Argumentation constitutes the dialectical link for his notions of
justice and solidarity,4 and serves as the main component of his
deliberative theory of democracy.5
Some aspects of argumentation, however, are believed to
have developed from Western contexts and thus bring doubt to its
applicability in communitarian lifeworlds in Asia and other
regions. Habermas earlier responded to such doubts by referring to
his theory of societal evolution, and its homologies with the
development of ego-identities. 6 In this response, Habermas
explains that social integration in all societies follow an internal
2

Jürgen Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, trans.
Christian Lenhardt, et al. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990a), 154.
3
Ibid., 244.
4
Jürgen Habermas, “Justice And Solidarity: On The Discussion Concerning
Stage 6,” in The Moral Domain: Essays in the Ongoing Discussion Between Philosophy
and the Social Sciences, ed.Thomas Wren et al. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990b),
224-254 ; A more elaborate discussion on the dialectical relation between justice
and solidarity through discourse or argumentation can be found in his later essay,
“A Genealogical Analysis of the Cognitive Content of Morality,” in The Inclusion
of The Other: Studies in Political Theory, ed. Ciaran Cronin et al. (Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press, 1998), 29-46.
5
Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, 110, 460.
6
Jürgen Habermas, “Toward a Reconstruction of Historical Materialism” in
Communication and the Evolution of Society, trans. Thomas McCarthy (Boston:
Beacon, 1979), 95 -129. Habermas focuses here on general patterns of
rationalization in societies. In another essay within the same volume, “Moral
Development and Ego-identity,” 69-94, and in later essays, he elaborates on
general patterns of rationalization from the perspective of the development of
lifeworld members into autonomous individuals. See “Moral Consciousness and
Communicative Action,” in Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, 116194, and in “Individuation through Socialization: On George Herbert Mead’s
Theory of Subjectivity,” in Postmetaphysical Thinking: Philosophical Essays, trans.
William Mark Hohengarten (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992), 149-204.
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logic of rationalization, which becomes manifest in historically
varied ways, but nonetheless follows the same pattern of moving
towards more reflexive levels of integration. Habermas thus argues
against the claimed incompatibility between the Western paradigm
of individualism and the non-Western communitarians, by
showing that their apparent irreconcilability is merely a case of two
different lifeworlds looking at each other from different stages of
one singular dimension of rationalization processes. 7 Recently,
Habermas’s position took on a subtle shift. Rather than setting out
to level down their differences, he now acknowledges that the West,
being the origin of the development of capitalism and thereby the
first to learn of its perils, is more receptive to the idea of human
rights based on equality and autonomy because of its cultural
history. The non-West’s learning, meanwhile was “accelerated and
violent,” precisely due to the imposition of Western economic
organization of capitalism on its shores. 8 Habermas thus
acknowledges that the idea of human rights, which champions
autonomy and individuality, coincided with the development of
Western capitalism. He nonetheless argues that because the
capitalist organization of economy has become ever more global,
there is a general imperative on everyone to adapt accordingly.
I would like to highlight this subtle shift in Habermas’s
position and the implications it bears regarding the compatibility
of argumentation with all cultural lifeworlds, as it rests on the
assumption of the autonomy of its individual participants. This
question touches on the peculiarity of the place of argumentation
in the Philippine setting, being one of the “more Western”
developing countries in Asia because of its colonial history. As with
many postcolonial societies, Philippine society had to walk through
a fragmented understanding of modernization where institutions
of politics and economy have been imposed from without, while
the traditional lifeworlds tread through patchy and dead-end roads
in their attempts to achieve more reflexive self-understanding.
7
Jürgen Habermas, Autonomy and Solidarity: Interviews with Jürgen Habermas,
ed. Peter Dews (London: Verso, 1986), 169.
8
Jürgen Habermas, The Postnational Constellation: Political Essays, trans. Max
Pensky (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2001), 126.
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From the outset, the present continuous clash between modern
systems and the people’s clinging to traditional norms and their
collective identities signals the Filipinos’ rejection of rationalization
and modernization processes as a whole. In this essay, I offer a
perspective for understanding this apparent “refusal” towards
rationalization. I argue here that the rejection should be more
attributed to the absence of an imagination of rationalization
processes other than its configuration in the West, than to the
incommensurability of the Western and non-Western lifeworlds. I
argue here that Habermas’s model of inclusive conflict resolution
through argumentation can be made compatible with Filipino
sensibilities only if the central components of reflexivity and
autonomy are developed from within their own characteristic
linguistic processes. I assume here with Habermas that the
development into autonomous individuals is not insurmountable,
however gradual it may be.
This paper is thus a work in the
fringes of an attempt to sketch out possible forms of adaptation of
the Western rational form of argumentation into the Philippine
context. In section one, I will discuss the constellation of modes of
communication that resembles and contrasts with Habermas’s
notion of argumentation, and why in the present context, it is
difficult for Habermas’s notion of argumentation to take root in
Philippine soil. In section two, I will elaborate on Habermas’s
possible responses to this alleged incompatibility. Finally, I will
show in section three how the local modes of everyday
communication in the Philippines can bring about moments of
reflexivity and thereby enable individuals to engage in
“argumentation” which champions reflexivity and inclusiveness
without the high price of compromising the thick sense of solidarity
in which their identities rest.

ARGUMENTATION IN THE PHILIPPINE LANGUAGE:
NAGTATALO, NAG-AAWAY, NAG-UUSAP
It is difficult to find an exact translation of Habermas’s
conception of argumentation in the Philippine national language
(Filipino). Rather than a single term, the closest equivalent would
be a constellation of modes of communication related to
120
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argumentation. In what follows, I provide a descriptive account of
each of the following modes of communication as used in the
everyday Philippine context: nagtatalo (A1), nag-aaway (A2), naguusap (A3).9
Argumentation in the Philippine context is commonly
translated in Filipino as nagtatalo, which literally means the state of
rational verbal competition over something. It is a lively exchange
of reasons. Defined as such, A1 bears a resemblance with
Habermas’s conception of argumentation—as a competition, a
“practice of giving and taking reasons, a “game” with rules.”10 The
rules of nagtatalo are generally assumed as follows: 1) it is a friendly
competition, as such the relationships of symmetry in friendship is
presupposed; 2) the subject of argumentation can be about
anything—sports, ideas, news, politics—that does not directly touch
on one’s personal issues, claims or needs. Thus, a characteristic of
nagtatalo as argumentation is the aspect of detachment among
interlocutors. Such a detachment is evident in their ability to banter
and tease each other while arguing, a salient move to ward off the
tension that a competition can bring.
Nagtatalo should be understood as encompassed within the
broader mode of communication of kwentuhan. Kwentuhan is often
translated as “conversation,”11 but literally means “story-telling” or
the exchange of stories. Sometimes when having a conversation,
Filipinos would simply describe themselves as “nag-kukwentuhan.”
This common mode of communication has such a binding power
that it permeates the everyday life of the ordinary Filipino. 12
9

Other terms used are more of appropriations from colonial languages.
Nagdidiskusyon is an appropriation from the Spanish discusíon, which is normally
used in formal occasions. Also used is nagde-debate which is obviously the Filipino
appropriation of the English term debate.
10
Jürgen Habermas, “Concluding Comments on Empirical Approaches to
Deliberative Politics," Acta Politica 40, no. 3 (2005): 385.
11
Kwentuhan “can both mean conversation and story-telling” or conversation
that “can include a lot of story-telling.” See Ma. Marilou Ibita, “A Conversation
with the Story of the Lord’s Supper in 1 Corinthians 11:17-34; Engaging the
Scripture Text and the Filipino Christians' Context,” in 1 and 2 Corinthians, ed. Y
S Kim. (MN: Fortress Press).
12
Ibid.
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Kwentuhan is one of the most effective means of social bonding in
the Philippines. It is within this setting where we can say
argumentation as A1 is set in a relatively comfortable situation. The
place of A1 within the context of kwentuhan gives sense to the
expression, “Hindi kami nag-aaway. Nagtatalo lang.” (We are not
fighting. We are just arguing). There is the thick social bond of
community that underlies kwentuhan, so that as soon as
argumentation is taken out of this context, it is no longer
considered as nagtatalo, but as nag-aaway (A2).
Nag-aaway literally means “fighting,” either exclusively
through the exchange of abusive words or the use of violence, or
both. Argumentation as A2 resembles Habermas’s notion of
argumentation as it is also a mode of raising real claims based on
interests, and involves criticizing the validity claims of others. Once
argumentation involves real claims, the exchange becomes more
serious and cuts through a more personal level. There is a strong
tendency towards violence present in A2. Since the conflict that
arises in A2 marks a severing from the interpersonal bond of
kwentuhan, the resolution of the conflict would need the solidarityforging power of a mediator. Under the presence of the mediator,
the communicative mode among parties becomes the calm
exchange called nag-uusap (A3).
A3 is translated as “conversation” but takes on a more
serious tone, in contrast with the congenial and lively tone that
characterizes kwentuhan. A3 is especially used in situations involving
processes of coming to agreement — “Pag-usapan natin ‘to.” (“Let’s
talk about this” or “Let’s agree on this”). The resemblance of A3
with Habermas’s argumentation is found in this feature of coming
to an agreement. Among the three, it is the second and third
notions of argumentation which are most politically relevant.
Taken together, A2 and A3 comprise the political process of
conflict resolution.
The most noted feature of Filipino conflict resolution is
the need for the authority of mediation. This is not to say that the
Habermasian notion of argumentation as a formal procedure of
consensus formation has not yet been institutionalized in
Philippine society. It is, in principle, the mode of communication
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used by institutions for procedures of justification such as those in
the legislative branch of the government. Nonetheless, the use of
mediation “as a means of avoiding state legal institutions” in
Philippine society remains widespread. 13 For a more focused
analysis on this, I turn to the documented account of a widely
applied (informal) justice system among the rural poor: the
Barangay Justice System (BJS). I highlight here the reasons offered
by the analysts for the rural poor’s preference for BJS over formal
institutions in resolving their disputes.14
In the landscape of Philippine politics, the barangay was
designated as the lowest unit of state control by then President
Ferdinand Marcos during the martial law regime in the 1970s. This
was partly done in order to “rationalize and to bring under state
control” the folk or indigenous system of conflict resolution.15 The
“procedure” used in the BJS varies and has developed through time.
What has remained unchanged, which is also why it is gaining
popular assent today, is its wide accessibility to the masses and its
promise for a quick remedy for divisions within the community.16
Although the BJS has been placed in contradistinction with the
formal system of procedures in the judiciary court, it nonetheless
has an element of order in it. This is evident in the way the
procedure unfolds, which begins with the complainant and
respondent being called to a hearing that usually culminates in an
“amicable settlement” among parties through the authority of the
mediator. The procedure concludes with a “ritual” of
reconciliation. 17

13
Sidney Silliman, "A Political Analysis of the Philippines' Katarungang
Pambarangay System of Informal Justice through Mediation," Law and Society
Review, 19 (1985), 279-301.
14
Ibid. See also Kit G. Machado, "Politics and Dispute-Processing in the
Rural Philippines," Pacific Affairs, 52 (1979), 294-314; and Jennifer C. Franco,
"Peripheral Justice? Rethinking Justice Sector Reform in the Philippines," World
Development 36 (2008), 1858-1873.
15
Sidney Silliman, “A Political Analysis…,” 284.
16
Kit Machado, “Politics and Dispute-Processing…,” 301.
17
Sidney Silliman, “A Political Analysis…,” 292.
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From the perspective of the state, the institutionalization
of the BJS was a mechanism for rationalizing political power by
“reducing the significance of local elites” and channeling power to
local leaders legitimized by state law.18 From the perspective of the
masses, however, the legitimacy of the state’s institutionalization of
power through the BJS was viewed differently. Silliman observed
that the villagers were supportive of BJS because it was perceived as
a continuation of the shared traditional norm which upheld “key
values and beliefs” of their collective identity. For the villagers in
the Visayas region, for instance, the BJS was treated as husay which
meant "hearing" or a "settling of accounts,” which as an adjective
that also means "orderly," "without confusion," or "well arranged
with everything put in its place." Husay is also associated with hilot,
which means “healing.”(Is this the correct translation of hilot?) The
perception of the BJS as a procedure of “healing” thus implies that
the villagers view conflict as a form of injury or wound to the
collective order that needed healing.
In contrast to the BJS, the higher and more formal justice
systems were regarded as ineffective in handling broken social
relationships. For instance, the rural poor in the Tagalog region,
according to Machado, perceive the formal legal system as that
which “exacerbates conflict and increases the likelihood of
violence.” 19 With this general perception, it was likely that the
people turned to the BJS more than to the higher courts for settling
disputes. Machado significantly notes that this trend among the
rural poor includes criminal cases, which, by law, should be directly
handled by the higher courts. According to Machado’s analysis,
“The transplanted Western legal assumption that
the public is an aggrieved party when certain acts,
defined as criminal, are committed is not widely
shared by Filipinos. Such acts tend to be viewed as
private matters between the parties and their
families. In rural communities where Filipinos have
many-faceted, long-enduring relationships with
their neighbors, many of whom may be relatives;
18
19
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there is a presumption in favor of compromise and
reconciliation rather than further disruption of a
personal and community relationships by active
prosecution of criminal complaint. Many Filipinos,
lacking economic security, are usually more
concerned about recovering damages than about
vindicating an abstract public claim against a
wrongdoer.” 20

I would like to highlight here what Machado points out as
the schism within the formal justice system of the Philippines,
which is created by the “transplanted” assumption of individual
rights and from the colonial West (Spain and U.S) that runs in
tension with the traditional/ indigenous core values of prioritizing
interpersonal relations in the Philippines. Silliman shares this claim
when he shows the conflicting attitudes towards the BJS between
the institutional level and the grassroots level. The commonality in
Machado’s and Silliman’s analyses can be attributed to their
dependence on the analysis of the American sociologist Frank
Lynch. Lynch is known to have placed the core of Filipino identity
on the high value given to “smooth interpersonal relations” (SIR).
SIR, according to Lynch, explains the behavioral pattern of
avoidance among Filipinos when it comes to confrontational
interactions. This supports Machado and Silliman’s observation of
their subjects who mostly disfavored formal court procedures as
these were detrimental to SIR.
Lynch’s SIR approach to explaining Filipino social
behavior was, however, criticized by local scholars for its “positivist
and functionalist preoccupation.”21 It was criticized as “colonial” in
perspective22 because it reinforces a mistaken impression that the
social behavioral pattern of Filipinos “leaves no room for atypical

20

Ibid., 300.
Victor T. King, Sociology of South-East Asia: Transformations in a Developing
Region. Vol.3. (Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2008): 28.
22
Niels Mulder, "The Crux Is the Skin: Reflections on Southeast Asian
Personhood,” Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 30 (2011): 100.
21
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challenges to the social order. 23 Filipino behavior explained this
way presents SIR less as a value and more as a “syndrome” of
passivity that also translates into complicity. 24 Mendoza and
Perkinson argue that the Western framework used for this longheld observation subjects it to unfair normative evaluations. It
paints the Filipino’s consistent concern for social relations and
group harmony as a “trivial pursuit” which is “counterproductive.”
An alternative to the analysis of SIR can be found in the
initiative of Virigilio Enriquez and the nationalist research program
of Sikolohiyang Pilipino (Filipino psychology). 25 According to
Enriquez, a better approach to understanding Filipino behavior is
to look into the resources of the Filipino (Tagalog) language. In this
approach, kapwa, as a concept for social relations is posited as an
alternative core value to SIR. Whereas the latter projects a
superficial and functionalist view of social relations, the former
implies how the value of social relations is embedded in one’s very
own self-understanding:
Kapwa literally means “fellow-being” or “both,” as in
“Kapwa silang mabait” (They are both good). As the
“superordinate concept” of social understanding,
kapwa is captured, but exceeds, the sense of the
English “other”.
“In English the word “others” is actually used in the
opposition to the “self,” and implies the recognition
of the self as a separate identity. In contrast, kapwa
is recognition of a shared identity.” 26

23
Reynaldo Clemeña Ileto, Pasyon and Revolution: Popular Movements in the
Philippines, 1840-1910 (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1979),
12.
24
Lily S. Mendoza, et al., “Filipino ‘Kapwa’ in Global Dialogue: A Different
Politics of Being-With the ‘Other’,” Intercultural Communication Studies 12 (2003):
186
25
Virgilio G. Enriquez, "Kapwa: A Core Concept in Filipino Social
Psychology," Philippine Social Sciences and Humanities Review 42 (1978): 100-108.
26
Ibid., 102.
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To understand this better, one must comprehend the
designated Filipino notion of the self — loob, “where the true worth
of a person lies.” 27 Loob, literally is a spatial concept that means
“inside.” The Filipino who refers to her inner self as “kalooban” is
referring to a metaphysical space. Yet the spatial connotation is also
misleading, for it denotes delineated boundaries of the inner self,
as if to convey a clear sense of individuality. Filipino psychologist
Jaime Bulatao, explains loob by way of comparison with the
Northern Americans’ sense of individuality. He claims that
Filipinos are like “so many fried eggs in a pan whose experience of
the self consists of a ‘core’ (the yolk) but with the outer core (the
egg white) blurring into/with the outer core of other eggs in a
coterminous fashion.” By contrast, Americans are like “hard-boiled
eggs whose individual shells protect their autonomy and who then
exercise the option to either open themselves (or part of themselves)
to others or not at all.”28 It is not very clear what the ‘core of the
self’ means here and how it is distinguished from other selves. What
is important for our purpose is the general agreement among the
sociologists and psychologists at that time on the Filipino sense of
self which was heavily entangled with collective identity.
The unclear delineation of the Filipino sense of
individuality makes the concept kapwa more comprehensible as a
notion that accommodates both the self and the other. When one
refers to another as her kapwa, it implies “an awareness of shared
identity.” According to Enriquez, “Once ako (ego) starts thinking of
him/herself as different from kapwa, the self, in effect denies the
status of kapwa to the other.” For Enriquez and the proponents of
Sikolohiyang Pilipino, kapwa is the defining concept of the Filipino
self-understanding. 29 It is also regarded as the person’s utmost

27

Reynaldo C. Ileto, Pasyon and Revolution, 20.
Lily S. Mendoza, “Filipino ‘Kapwa’ in Global Dialogue…,” 288.
29
Ibid., See also Katrin De Guia, Kapwa: The Self in the Other: Worldviews and
Lifestyles of Filipino Culture-bearers (Quezon City: Anvil Pub., 2005).; Rogelia PeǦ
Pua, et al., "Sikolohiyang Pilipino (Filipino psychology): A legacy of Virgilio G.
Enriquez," Asian Journal of Social Psychology 3 (2000): 49-71.; and Ibana, Rainier A.
"Grafting Philosophy to the Tagalog Prefix Ka," Kritika Kultura 12 (2009): 27-60.
28
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expression of being human (tao). Enriquez explains this in the
negative sense:
“One argument for the greater importance of kapwa
in Filipino thought and behavior is the shock or
disbelief that the Filipino registers when confronted
with one who is supposedly walang kapwa (-tao) [no
sense of kapwa]. If one is walang pakisama [having no
ability to get along], others might still say, “He would
eventually learn” or “Let him be; that’s his
prerogative.” If one is walang hiya [no shame], others
say, “His parents should teach him a thing or two.”
If one is walang utang na loob [no debt of gratitude]
others might advise, “Avoid him.” But if one is
walang kapwa tao [no sense of kapwa], people say,
“He must have reached rock bottom. Napakasama
na niya. He is the worst.30 ”

If we follow the logic of kapwa and loob, one can extract a
more comprehensive account for the Filipinos’ view of social
conflict and their constant need for mediation processes. To a
certain extent, informal procedures of conflict regulation such as
the BJS preserve the continuity of kapwa relation and the integrity
of the loob. The same is true for the three common views on
argumentation: nagtatalo, nag-aaway, and nag-uusap. A conflict is
generally perceived as an abstraction from kapwa relations, but
since the ego or loob is thickly connected to kapwa relations, the
abstraction is perceived as injurious to one’s person. This is why for
many Filipinos a kapwa approach to social relations makes them
more responsive, while the reverse makes them feel alienated. An
example for this is their personalistic form of politics. If we accept
this alternative explanation, then we are more prepared to
understand that the lack of predisposition towards formal
procedures of argumentation bears a more fundamental issue—the
issue regarding one’s very own sense of self.

30
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AND

HABERMAS ON ASIAN COMMUNITARIANS
THE DEFENSE OF INDIVIDUAL HUMAN RIGHTS

My above excursion into the underlying social psychology
on the Filipino norm on conflict resolution should not be
misconstrued as reinforcing what has been noted as an
oversimplified dichotomy between “Western individualism” and
“Asian communitarianism.”31 To many Western thinkers and their
critics, this dichotomy turns issues regarding individual human
rights as irresolvable due to the incommensurability of cultural
horizons. Habermas is one to strongly argue against this by first
pointing out that there is no real dilemma between them. Drawing
from his individuation through socialization thesis, he asserts that
individualism and communitarianism can be viewed in a dialectical
tension.32 This thesis, which he draws from George Herbert Mead,
explains the ontogenesis of ego-identities through progressive stages
of socialization. The most advanced among these stages consist of
socialization processes through the use of critical and reflexive
communicative exchanges, namely, argumentation. Individuals
socialized or steeped in argumentative settings develop post
conventional ego identities.33 The dialectical relationship between
communitarianism and individualism, based on this thesis, can be
portrayed as the different stages in which the tension between
individual interests and the collective interests of the community is
worked out towards equilibrium. For instance, in the conventional
stage of socialization, the collective interest prevails over the
individual’s desires and intentions; whereas in the post
conventional stage, the individual is caught in a dialectical struggle
with the collective. This struggle, however, can be a productive one
as long as tensions are worked out through linguistic processes such
as rational argumentation. Put in roughly simplistic terms,
Habermas’s individuation through socialization thesis argues that
31

Fernando N. Zialcita, “The Meanings of Community,” Philippine Studies 44
(1996): 33-34.
32
Habermas, Postmetaphysical Thinking: Philosophical Essays, trans. William
Mark Hohengarten (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,1992), 126.
33
Ibid., 188-193.
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the more individuals engage in discursive processes of resolving
disagreements, the more they develop their ego-identities. At the
same time, communities become ever more inclusive and
progressive in the post conventional stage of individuation as
individuals become more critical of the limits of their traditional
mentalities and open towards other ways of thinking.
The individuation through socialization thesis, in relation
to Asian communitarianism in its extreme form, puts forward the
claim that a pure collective sense of self without individual egoidentities is untenable for as long as the socialization processes in
which members of the community are developed consist in the use
of linguistic processes. The same can be said of Western
individualism in its extreme form. As Habermas noted, there can
be no such thing as possessive individualism because the sources of
one’s ego-identity are intricately linked with socialization
processes.34 This is not to deny, however, that there are gradations
in the individuation process such that some societies have higher
levels of individualism than with others. For Habermas the
difference can be attributed to the advance in levels of
communication in some societies. For Habermas, the more
reflexive communication in a society becomes, the more the society
is able to produce autonomous ego-identities.35 At the same time,
the more individuals grow into innovative pacemakers, the more
possible it is for their society to advance through the work of
creative political struggles.36 Viewed in linguistic terms, high levels
of reflexivity in socialization processes are seen to be embodied in
argumentation processes.
If Habermas were to relate this thesis to the Filipino notion
of loob, he would say that individuation of this diffused subjectivity
is in progress for as long as it maintains a dialectical tension with
kapwa. Thus a crucial step for its advance in development is a
34

Jürgen Habermas, The Postnational Constellation,126.
Jürgen Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, 160-170.
36
Jürgen Habermas, The Theory Of Communicative Action, Vol.2: Lifeworld And
System. A Critique Of Functionalist Reason, trans. Thomas McCarthy (Boston:
Beacon, 1989): 168. See also Postmetaphysical Thinking, 180.
35

130

MARIA LOVELYN CORPUZ PACLIBAR

moment of self-problematization, specifically in the form of an
identity crisis that would release the ego’s spontaneity towards
creativity.37 Conflicts that arise among community members can be
viewed as productive disruption in this sense. They can be
considered as momentary displacements of individuals from their
entanglements in the kapwa relations, which would in turn provide
openings for reflexivity and critical thinking. Hence, Habermas
would then remark that to view conflicts in communities as gaps
that need to be filled in by the mediator (healer) would be to miss
out on the opportunity for growth among the individuals and in
the collective whole. Nonetheless, the impetus for growth and
reflexivity should develop from within the community, and cannot
be forced from outside. It is from this idea of immanence where
Habermas concludes that the modernization processes in the postcolonial or non-Western communities have been violently
accelerated.
But the problem with Habermas’s individuation through
socialization thesis is that it does not elaborate enough on these
historical differences. Ilan Kapoor points out that Habermas’s
account of modernization, which includes the development of
reflexive societies and autonomous ego-identities “so neatly
coincided with Western historical development.”38
Hence, the question arises on how we are to account for
the socialization of individuals immersed in a society whose
establishment of modern institutions did not coincide with its
rationalization process. This question comes from the perspective
of the Habermasian reading of modernization as a process “in
which social systems, generated from out a traditional lifeworld,
become increasingly complex, while the lifeworld becomes
increasingly rationalized.” Such dual process must be understood
as “an intricately intertwined transformation.39 Clearly, this kind of
37
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modernization is not what happened in the colonial history of the
Philippines. The systems did not grow out of the rationalization of
their traditional lifeworlds but were colonially imposed. At the
same time, lifeworld members had to cope with a rationalization
process impelled by an educational system that was not well
integrated with their everyday lives. From the educated elite’s point
of view, however, this stunted rationalization process is often
attributed to poor access to universal education. 40 Such a
statement, however, obscures the point that even education was
used as a mechanism for colonization. 41 The question is not
whether Filipinos have been educated, but whether or not they
have been educated so that their society can come to examine itself.
How then can the Filipino society imagine rationalization
processes as developing from within their own lifeworld? The
project of the historian Reynaldo Ileto points to this direction: an
elaboration of conceptual tools that would help in understanding
the historical development of Philippine society from below. Ileto’s
achievement was to bring about an understanding of the revolt of
the masses beyond the dichotomy made between the Enlightened
revolution led by the intelligentsia and the so-called small reactive
revolution of the masses.42 This project in some respects coincided
with the research program of Sikolohiyang Pilipino, 43 which we
discussed in the previous section. It is against the backdrop of these
initiatives where I shall sketch in the last section some areas where
reflexivity can develop out of everyday communicative processes.
Before I proceed, however, I would like to take up a compelling
problem that challenges rationalization processes as illustrated in
the following example.
Another dimension of Philippine politics is revealed in a
more recent analysis of the BJS. According to Jennifer Franco, the
BJS remains to be widely used for processing disputes to this day,
but is largely used for cases among the poor. There is no recorded
40
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case; however, that involves conflicts between the poor and the
“influential,” such as that of a landowner and a tenant. These cases
are rather filed in the higher courts, where the poor are sidelined
and harassed because of the amount of influence their opponents
exert on the court officials. Furthermore, Franco noted that some
mediators in the BJS are known to side with the powerful when it
comes to endorsing or rejecting cases to be brought to the higher
court.44
What is shown in this example is a clash between
traditional norms of social integration and the formal processes of
integration through the force of positive law. The former
presupposes non-autonomous individuals turning to mediators
whose authority are legitimated by tradition. The latter presupposes
autonomous individuals who view themselves as equal before the
law, and turn to the integrative force of the law for the resolution
of conflicts. The clash between two forms of social integration
illustrates a point Habermas raises in his engagement with Asian
communitarian leaders who perceive the legitimation of laws
through human rights as incompatible with their political ethos.
According to Habermas, these leaders’ rejection somewhat raises
the suspicion against them who have mostly stayed in power
through non-democratic means. The problem with their rejection
of the calls for legitimation based on human rights is that it runs
incompatible with their acceptance of the benefits of modern
capitalism. Habermas argues that these leaders cannot, on the one
hand, participate in this ever more global economic system, and,
on the other hand, reject its presuppositions of autonomy and
equality. After all, capitalism and its universalistic orientation of
freedom and equality, was the impetus that has led to the
development of positive law. Hence, to welcome the system of
capitalism in one’s traditional lifeworld is to implicitly accept its
presuppositions of upholding individual freedom and equality.
Habermas, thus, argues that the notion of individual
human rights contained within the logic of capitalist systems must
be viewed in a functionalist sense as opposed to its metaphysical
44
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interpretation that heavily draws on Western culture. He points
out that the institutionalization of human rights through positive
laws in the West was a mechanism for responding to the inevitable
harmful consequences of capitalism. Hence, it was a necessary
counterpart of the modern economic system. Habermas admits,
however, that autonomy and equality, properties that constitute the
institutionalization of human rights, arose out of processes of
reflexivity in the West. Furthermore, he acknowledges that reflexive
distance from tradition is indeed an “advantage” of occidental
rationalism.45 Finally, he is well aware that the establishment of
capitalism and a systematized politics in the non-Western
developing countries has indeed been unjustly imposed.46
Considering all these, it becomes understandable that
modernization and rationalization processes in postcolonial
societies like the Philippines tread on a more complicated path. Yet,
as Habermas would argue, Philippine society cannot ride on the
benefits of the capitalist system and simultaneously reject its
presuppositions. Habermas would then propose that the alternative
to stubborn rejection would be the “adaptation” of traditional
forms of social integration towards capitalism’s “hard-to-resist’
imperatives.
He offers here a guiding insight for grappling with the
schism between the imposed western system of economics and
political administration, on the one hand, and the lifeworld
contexts of the Philippines, on the other hand. In the example I
have last noted, we have seen that the schism between the formal
system of conflict resolution and the traditional mode of social
integration is more or less encouraged in order to perpetuate the
interests of the powerful in impending the rational development of
the poor. Based on Habermas’s functionalistic understanding of
human rights, one can counter this tendency by freeing up the
rationalization processes that are latent within the traditional
lifeworlds. Adaptation can only begin when traditional norms are
self-examined through the displacement and astonishment brought
about by what is foreign and “new”. But how is this possible
45
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without completely drying up the sources of kapwa-solidarity on
which the identities of lifeworld members stand? The key is to
locate rationalization processes within the very mode of
communication that maintains and nurtures this sense of
solidarity.

NARRATIVE DISCOURSE AS ENABLING
ARGUMENTATIVE DISCOURSR
In my analysis of the constellation of three modes of
communication pertaining to argumentation, I have shown that
the first mode, nagtatalo (A1) is the closest to Habermas’s idea of an
argumentation process—it has the structure of a competition or a
game of reasons, and it presupposes equality or symmetry among
participants. This is opposed to nag-aaway (A2), which as we have
said can be a violent struggle of power. The competition in A1often
does not pertain to a real conflict, and the process of reaching
understanding is not a real concern. These two components, as we
have shown, only appear in A2. Meanwhile A2, as we have also
shown, is distinguished from Habermas’s argumentation through
the absence of a presupposition of mutual recognition of autonomy
among participants. As such the power struggle can only come to a
stalemate through a mediating authority. The shift from “game”
mode to real power struggle is explained by the abstraction from
the context of kwentuhan, a shift that signals an abstraction from
thicker forms of solidarity.
If the separation from the binding context of kwentuhan
leads to the development of a more abstract sense of solidarity, then
A2 can take on the referred to features of idealizations of
argumentation among “members of a community of world citizens”
bound by human rights. What would then make argumentation in
the Philippine context approximate Habermas’s idealization? As in
all forms of argumentation, there must be an institutionalization of
the idealizations presupposed within the very structure of
argumentation. What Habermas means here is that there are
idealizations we unavoidably make whenever we engage in
argumentation. One of these idealizations is the reciprocal
recognition
of
symmetry
among
participants.
The
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institutionalization of this presupposition is already expressed in
the idea of human rights backed by positive law. This
institutionalization, however, need not be perceived as something
that is externally imposed on the lifeworld of Philippine society.
Just as we understand other forms of abstraction, the
institutionalization of the recognition of individual freedom and
equality can be viewed as the extension of the presuppositions of
symmetry from friendships, towards a more inclusive, albeit
abstract, community.
The problem therefore that underlies the apparent
incompatibility between Habermas’s notion of argumentation
processes and the Filipino mode of conflict resolution is a solidarity
issue. Argumentation processes are based on an abstract, legal sense
of solidarity, whereas the Filipino mode of conflict resolution banks
on the thicker forms of solidarity within traditional communities.
Habermas argues that a thicker sense of solidarity is “neither
possible nor necessary” in the level of global legal community. 47 If
we relate this to his discourse theory, he would say that the thicker
bonds among participants in argumentation could hardly be
maintained in the process, and need not be (what? Or, are not
needed?). If we are to prevent real conflicts to turn into violent ones
(A2), then one will just have to take up the painful process of
detachment from thicker forms of solidarity and count on the
binding force of positive law to ensure that the resolution of
conflicts are made against the framework of equal treatment and
reciprocal recognition of human rights.
Doubtless that this process would be unavoidably difficult,
it is important to imagine ways in which the momentary
abstraction from the kapwa sense of solidarity can be made
bearable for the traditional Filipino. As we recall, it is not only the
thick interpersonal relations which are at stake in the resolution of
conflict through argumentation, but also the lifeworld member’s
sense of self. Hence, we must ask, in what ways can a participant
in a traditional lifeworld come to terms with her capacity to author
her “yes” or “no” positions in argumentation?

47
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One approach would be to complement argumentative
discourse with another mode of communication that is close to
Filipino sensibilities — the narrative mode of discourse or
kwentuhan. I have not yet underscored enough how kwentuhan
defines the everyday life of the Filipino. One evidently sees this in
the physiognomy of a Filipino neighborhood as carved to
accommodate kwentuhan. For instance, one would find benches in
front of mini-grocery shops called sari-sari stores where buyers can
sit, greet and exchange stories with other random buyers. A
common sight in old houses in the provincial areas is a porch where
neighbors can sit together and trade stories during the idle time of
the day, or drink together in the evening. Media technology has
been appropriated for this mode of communication as well, such
that the country has become well known as the “text-messaging
capital of the world”. Furthermore, popular radio and television
networks adopt the kwentuhan mode of news casting because it is
viewed as an effective way of drawing audiences. Kwentuhan is such
an integral part of the Filipino social life that it would not be odd
to find strangers in a long bus ride exchanging stories about their
lives even before they introduce each other’s names.
If kwentuhan defines the fabric of the social Filipino’s life,
it might very well be the best starting point to develop more
reflexive modes of communication. Iris Marion Young’s reflections
on inclusive political communication, has highlighted some ways
in which this can be possible. Narrative discourses, according to
Young, serve as supplements to argumentation because they have
the function of illustrating, describing, or justifying a point made
in discussions. 48 They have the potential of “enlarging the
imagination” of listeners, and thus enabling a more cooperative
process of reaching agreement. Moreover, it has a less constraining
advantage over argumentation because it provides more means for
the untrained marginalized poor to express their claims. What
deserves merit in Young’s focus on narrative is how she sketches
out possible directions for drawing out voices that have been muted
by dominant discourses:
48
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How can a group that suffers a particular harm or
oppression move from a situation of total silencing
and exclusion with respect to this suffering to its
public expression? Storytelling is often an important
bridge in such cases between the mute experience of
being wronged and particular arguments about
justice. Those who experience the wrong, and
perhaps some others who sense it, may have no
language for expressing the suffering as an injustice,
but nevertheless they can tell stories that relate a
sense of wrong. 49

Young’s emphasis on narrative as a mere tool for
arguments, however, tends to miss out on the rational potential
that narratives have in their own right. This latter view of narratives
is the sense in which I want to take up the argument-enabling
potential of kwentuhan. Kwentuhan enables argumentation because
first, it helps build a more or less clear sense of the claims one wants
to raise. Whereas argumentation presupposes that actors are clear
about what they want and what they are arguing for, narrative
discourse gives more space for the author to grope through, cohere,
or negotiate among various, sometimes connected, at times
conflicting desires. The act of bringing together is the moment of
agency, where the actor finds herself authoring narratives “to
reposition his or her self within an ever-changing social milieu.”50
Second, the dialectical movement of exchanging stories
can shed light on what narratives are suppressed by the existing
traditional normative order. This is often made possible through
the receptivity of a listening silence — a silence that cares. Eric
Ratliff, a male American ethnographer on the narrative practices of
Filipino exotic dancers notes how giving time for conversations and
dialogue with the women has made the latter more comfortable in
sharing their stories. In the process, they also shared their identities
as revealed in their desires and aspirations which urged them to
enter this socially frowned upon job in Philippine society. A crucial
49
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achievement of Ratliff here is the precarious balance he was able to
work out in between being viewed as an intimate friend (a “kuya,”
which literally means elder brother but is used to refer to male
friends whom the addressors regard in a brotherly way) and an
outsider among the circle of the women dancers. Yet from this
inside/outside position, the women were able to stage through
narratives unconventional identities suppressed by dominant
political and socio-economic discourse. 51
This illustration helps emphasize my point on the
importance of viewing narrative discourses as a reflexive
communicative process apart from of argumentation. Narrative
discourses rests on an affective atmosphere of care and trust.
Although I agree with Young in saying that narrative discourses
help in articulating claims in argumentation, I have hesitations
about merely placing them within procedures that rest on abstract,
thin solidarity. Narratives are more told in an atmosphere of trust,
whereas argumentation takes place in a competitive atmosphere.
The better approach to viewing narrative as a supplement
to argumentation is in Axel Honneth’s paradigm of care. In this
approach, the enabling component of narratives lies “before” the
argumentative procedure, as a mode of communication that
prepares participants to be more receptive, empathetic, and
attentive to one another in argumentation processes. The idea here
is based on Honneth’s point that the “genetically precedent”
condition for abstract equality is care. Honneth argues that one can
51
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only find oneself able to treat another person as autonomous and
equal “if one’s own person has had the experience of unlimited care
at some time.”52 This is similar to the insight of the Philippine
historian, Reynaldo Ileto, on the close connections between
wholeness and freedom in the Filipino language. Freedom means
kalayaan. The rootword laya (free) is linked with layaw (a condition
in which one is “pampered like a child). The reference to childhood
as a “kind of lost Eden” implies a condition of “wholeness” in
which one was then immersed. Wholeness is experienced as the
result of care. Ileto highlights the connection between wholeness
and freedom, layaw and kalayaan, in order to illustrate how the zeal
of the revolutionaries against the Spaniards was only possible
because of the memory of a “pre-Spanish condition of wholeness,
bliss and contentment.”53 What deserves to be underscored here is
the idea that an important precondition for reflexive and
revolutionary impulse is the basic experience of care. Thus, one is
only able to have a sense of one’s autonomy, understand that all
possible others can also be autonomous, and be sensitive to the
violations of individual and collective autonomy through
experiences or encounters in which one has been cared for.
What kwentuhan mode of communication opens up,
therefore, is a space in which interlocutors experience the basic
security of care that conditions trust and recognition of one
another’s equality. Thus the institutionalization of narrative
discourse as a way of preparing individuals for participation in
formal justificatory discourses is worth exploring. Habermas has
said that the institutionalization of discourse or argumentation in
modern societies allows for an extension of solidarity beyond
limited contexts, which is a solidarity that is based on the autonomy
and equality of all.54 If the “voice of the other” is the “central moral
52
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phenomenon” of the institutionalization of discourse in modern
societies,55 then perhaps helping the muted other find its voice back
must also have a significant part of it.
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